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Abstract
The financial crisis which began in the U.S. in 2007 influenced all economies on a global scale fol-
lowing the collapse of Lehman Brothers in September 2008. As a response to the crisis, central banks 
started to implement non-standard monetary policy tools as well as short-term interest rates also 
known as standard policy tools in order to help monetary policy transmission channels work effec-
tively. The European Central Bank (ECB) implemented non-standard monetary policies as in addi-
tion to the standard policy tools during this period. The non-standard monetary policies introduced 
by the ECB were different from those implemented by other central banks (Fed, Bank of England) in 
terms of implementation and results. Firstly, the policies of the ECB were not specific to one single 
country. Secondly, the banking system was the major source of finance in Europe, which had an im-
pact on the policies. In this regard, the ECB introduced a policy of enhanced credit support consisting 
of five main elements in order to maintain price stability over the medium term following the crisis. 
By 2010, public debt in some member countries of the European Union reached high levels, requir-
ing them to take additional measures. The Securities Markets Programme was introduced to that end. 
Initially focusing on the debt securities of Greece, Ireland, and Portugal, the Securities Markets Pro-
gramme was expanded in August 2011 to cover the debt securities of Italy and Spain. In addition, two 
Long-term Refinancing Operations (LTROs) were introduced. This article presents a descriptive anal-
ysis of the non-standard monetary policy tools introduced by the ECB following the financial crisis. 
However, the monetary policy implemented in the Euro zone is not specific to one single country, and 
every country has a different financial structure, both of which limit the effectiveness of the policies 
* Date of Submission: 11.04.2016; Date of Acceptance: 14.02.2017
This study is the expanded version of a paper presented at International Istanbul Finance Congress 2013 
but not published.
** Uludag University, Faculty of Economics and Administrative Sciences, Asst. Prof. Dr.
82
Meryem FİLİZ BAŞTÜRK
implemented. The changing structure of the monetary policy implemented in the aftermath of the cri-
sis aims to help the transmission channel work effectively. This depends on countries’ having a strong 
budget and financial structure as well as an effective monetary policy. Therefore, general economic 
factors may have complicated impacts on shaping the expected results of the policies when there are 
various implementations of monetary policies.
Keywords: Non-standard Monetary Policy, The European Central Bank, Financial Crisis
fİNaNSal krİZİN ardiNdaN avruPa MerkeZ BaNkaSi tarafiNdaN 
uygulaNaN geleNekSel olMayaN Para Polİtİkalari
Öz
2007 yılında ABD’de başlayan finansal kriz 2008 Eylül ayında Lehman Brothers’ın iflasının ardın-
dan küresel ölçekte bütün ekonomileri etkisi altına almıştır. Krize cevap olarak merkez bankaları ta-
rafından para politikasının ekonomiye aktarım kanallarının etkin bir şekilde çalışmasını sağlamak 
amacıyla geleneksel politika aracı olarak da nitelendirilen kısa vadeli faiz oranları yanında gelenek-
sel olmayan para politikası araçları da kullanılmaya başlanmıştır. Avrupa Merkez Bankası (ECB) da 
bu dönemde geleneksel politika aracının yanında geleneksel olmayan para politikaları da uygulamış-
tır. Ancak ECB tarafından uygulanan geleneksel olmayan para politikaları, uygulama ve sonuçları iti-
barıyla diğer merkez bankası örneklerinden (Fed, Bank of England) ayrışmaktadır. İlk olarak ECB’nin 
uyguladığı politikalar tek bir ülkeye özgü değildir. İkinci olarak Avrupa’da bankacılık sisteminin temel 
finansman kaynağı olması, uygulanan politikalarda etkili olmuştur. Bu doğrultuda ECB tarafından fi-
nansal krizin ardından orta vadede fiyat istikrarını sağlamak için beş temel bileşenden oluşan arttırıl-
mış kredi desteği politikası uygulamaya konulmuştur. 2010 yılına gelindiğinde Avrupa Birliğine üye 
bazı ülkelerin kamu borçlarının yüksek seviyelere ulaşması ek önlemlerin alınmasını gerektirmiştir. 
Bu amaçla Menkul Kıymet Piyasaları Programı devreye sokulmuştur. Başlangıçta Yunanistan, İrlanda 
ve Portekiz’in borçlanma senetlerini içeren program, Ağustos 2011’de İtalya ve İspanya’nın borçlanma 
senetlerini de kapsayacak şekilde genişletilmiştir. Ayrıca Aralık 2011 ve Şubat 2012’de iki tane LTRO 
uygulamaya konulmuştur. Bu çalışmada finansal krizin ardından ECB tarafından uygulamaya konu-
lan geleneksel olmayan para politikası araçları betimsel olarak incelenmektedir. Ancak Euro bölgesi 
özelinde uygulanan para politikasının tek bir ülkeye özgü olmaması ve ülkelerin farklı mali yapılara 
sahip olması uygulanan politikaların etkinliğini kısıtlamaktadır. Krizden sonraki süreçte uygulanan 
para politikasının değişen yapısı aktarım mekanizmasının etkin bir şekilde çalışmasını amaçlamak-
tadır. Bunun başarılması da etkin bir para politikası yanında, ülkelerin sağlam bütçe ve mali yapılara 
sahip olmasına bağlıdır. Dolayısıyla para politikalarının çeşitlenen uygulamalarında, genel ekonomik 
faktörler politikalardan beklenen sonuçların şekillenmesinde karmaşık etkiler yapabilmektedir.
Anahtar Kelimeler: Geleneksel Olmayan Para Politikası, Avrupa Merkez Bankası, Finansal Kriz
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I. INTRODUCTION
Just like the previous crises, the economic crisis starting in the U.S. in 2007 was preceded 
by a period when asset prices increased sharply, long-term credits expanded, risky credits re-
sulting from low risk premium and liquidity abundance were financed. However, what dif-
ferentiated this crisis from the previous ones was that it gained a global dimension as it af-
fected all the economies. The factors making the crisis of 2007 different are that the financial 
innovations that rapidly emerged in recent years have made markets interdependent and 
that financial markets in developed countries have not been adequately monitored or super-
vised then (Claessens, et al. 2010:4-7).
Central banks responded to the crisis starting in August 2007 but turning into a global 
crisis in September 2008 with the collapse of Lehman Brothers by adopting standard and 
non-standard monetary policy tools. During the “Great Moderation”, there was a kind of 
agreement among countries on the implementation of monetary policy, and short-term in-
terest rates were adopted as policy tools. However, this standard policy tool was inadequate 
during the crisis. Like many central banks, the European Central Bank (ECB) also adopted 
non-standard monetary policy tools. However, these tools differ from one another in terms 
of the structure of financial systems and the functionality of transmission channels.
The central banks of developed countries took various measures as a response to the 
financial crisis of 2007. It is possible to see different classifications in studies analyzing 
non-standard monetary policies adopted by developed countries. For example, Lenza, et 
al. (2010) analyzed non-standard monetary policies under two categories: the policies be-
fore and after the collapse of Lehman Brothers. A similar classification was adopted by Ce-
cioni, et al. (2011) and Thronton (2012). However, when the Euro area is considered, an ad-
ditional classification is also required since additional measures came up in May 2010 when 
public debt levels of some member countries of the Euro area reached quite high levels. In 
the reports prepared by the ECB, the crisis is analyzed under four periods (ECB, 2010a:63; 
ECB, 2011:57). Their classification focused on the policies adopted before and after the col-
lapse of Lehman Brothers, removal of some non-standard policies, and the emergence of 
sovereign debt crisis (ECB, 2010a:63; ECB, 2011:57). This paper, though, adopts an analysis 
of three categories since the policies which were abolished or which authorities decided to 
abolish were adopted again with the emergence of the sovereign debt crisis. Following Cas-
sola, et al. (2010), Lane (2012), Trichet (2013) and Drudi, et al. (2012), this paper firstly ana-
lyzes the measures taken between August 2007 and September 2008, and between September 
2008 and May 2010. Then it focuses on the policies adopted by the ECB to solve the public 
debt problem of some countries.
Discussing the impacts of non-standard monetary policy tools adopted by the ECB 
during the crisis, this paper continues as follows. Section 2 examines transmission channels 
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in the Euro area prior to the crisis. Section 3 reviews the studies focusing on the effective-
ness of non-standard monetary policy tools. Section 4 analyses non-standard monetary pol-
icy tools adopted by the ECB as a response to the crisis starting in August 2007 in the U.S. 
but gaining a global dimension in September 2008 following the collapse of Lehman Broth-
ers. Section 5 analyzes the impact of fiscal condition on monetary policies.
II. TRANSMISSION CHANNELS IN THE EURO AREA PRIOR TO THE CRISIS
The main goal of the ECB is to ensure price stability in the medium term. In line with this 
goal, target inflation was set “below 2 percent but close to that percent” (Trichet, 2013:232). 
To achieve this goal, the ECB adopted a two-legged strategy: economic analysis and mone-
tary analysis, which are complementary (ECB, 2010c:64). Economic analysis tries to identify 
risks to price stability in the short term by following the real activity and financial develop-
ments in the economy. Monetary analysis, though, aims at crosschecking the economic anal-
ysis in the medium and long term by focusing on medium and long term risks to price sta-
bility (Scheller, 2006:83-85).
The effectiveness of the monetary policy adopted by the ECB to ensure price stability 
depends on whether transmission channels work properly or not. Monetary transmission 
mechanism, which describes monetary policy decisions affects total demand and inflation, 
works within various channels. But for the transmission channels to work, a change in pol-
icy interest rate must affect market interest rate (Taylor, 1995:11). The transmission mecha-
nism that consists of interest rate channel, credit channels, exchange rate channel and asset 
prices channel works effectively with interest rate channel in the Euro area (ECB, 2010a:60; 
ECB, 2010b:85-86). Exchange rate channel, though, is less effective in a big closed area like 
the Euro area when compared to small and open economies (Scheller, 2006:79).
Banks in the Euro area have an important role in the transmission of monetary policy. 
With the help of banks, monetary policies affect aggregate demand and inflation via vari-
ous channels, which are interest rate channel, credit channels and risk-taking channel (ECB, 
2009a:66). The table below presents a schematic overview of these channels, and they are 
then explained one by one.
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Through the interest rate channel, made up of two stages, short-term nominal interest 
rates affect long-term real interest rates via sticky wages and expectations theory. Long-term 
real interest rates that have a decisive impact on the decisions of households and firms about 
consumption and investment have a  impact on aggregate demand and inflation (Egert and 
MacDonald, 2009:280). Banks, with their large share, have an influential role in the financial 
system within the Euro area. Thus, the bank interest rate pass-through is a main determi-
ant of the interest rate channel (ECB, 2008:86). The interest rate channel, here, affe ts the 
demand for bank loans (ECB, 2009a:65). However, the financial crisis weakened the trans-
mission from interest rates used as a policy tool to money market interest rates and bank in-
terest rates (ECB, 2011:56).
The credit channel is composed of bank lending channel and balance sheet channel. Ac-
cording to the bank lending channel developed by Bernanke and Blinder (1988), the deposits 
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of banks in their liability accounts decrease as a result of a contractionary monetary policy. A 
decrease in deposits leads to a decline in bank loans kept in banks’ asset accounts and slows 
down the economy, thereby affecting the aggregate demand and inflation. For this channel to 
work, though, the decrease in bank deposits is required not to be compensated with securi-
ties (Bernanke and Blinder, 1992: 918-19). The balance sheet channel analyzes the impact of 
changes in monetary policy on the financial positions of borrowers (Cecchetti, 1995:85-86).
Financial innovations, however, have become more common in today’s world, which has 
increased securitization and introduction of new financial tools. As a result, access to dif-
ferent financial sources has become easier, and the dependence on bank loans has decreased 
(Bernanke and Gertler, 1995:42). As financial innovations increased the risk-taking atti-
tudes of banks, a new channel was added to the transmission channel. Through the risk-tak-
ing channel, low short-term interest rates enhance risk-taking potential of banks in various 
ways. First, low interest rates make risky assets more attractive to all investors. Second, banks 
also finance risky projects by lending more than necessary when interest rates are low and 
there is an abundance of liquidity (ECB, 2008:87; ECB, 2009a:68). All these developments 
made the bank lending channel less effective in the Euro area before 2007 (ECB, 2010b:89-
90). In line with this view, Altunbaş, et al. (2009) argued that securitization increased af-
ter euro was adopted as the single currency, and that bank lending channel weakened in the 
Euro area, as a result. This was explained based on two mechanisms. First, as asset securiti-
zation increases the liquidity of banks, the financial need of banks decreases when there is 
a contractionary monetary policy. Secondly, it gives banks an opportunity to canalize a spe-
cific amount of credit risk to markets.
The monetary transmission mechanism lost its function in the second quarter of 2007 
with the outbreak of the economic crisis of 2007 in the U.S. Starting in August 2007 as a sub-
prime mortgage crisis, it turned into a liquidity crisis in a short period of time and spread to 
all other countries. This crisis affected the Euro area via two mechanisms. First, the banks 
operating in the area were affected by the crisis as they invested in mortgage-backed secu-
rities. Secondly, banks largely stopped providing their counterparts with funds in the in-
terbank money market in such an uncertain environment. This ended up with decreasing 
transactions in interbank money market (Fahr, et al. 2011:26).
III. LITERATURE REVIEW
The impacts of non-standard monetary policies in the Euro area were categorized in the 
relevant studies as those before and after the emergence of the European Sovereign Debt Cri-
sis.
The empirical studies analyzing the effects of non-standard monetary policies in the Euro 
area agree on the fact that the policies implemented yield positive results. These studies, 
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however, generally focused on the period before May 2010. In other words, they analyzed 
the effectiveness of policies implemented in some countries within the Euro area for the pe-
riod when the public debt problem did not emerge yet. In this regard, Lenza et al. (2010) ana-
lyzed the impacts of non-standard monetary policies in the Euro area for the period between 
November 2008 and August 2009 by using B-VAR model. They indicated that the policies 
implemented had an impact on the real economy with some delay. They also emphasized 
that its impact on the inflation was also delayed. They concluded that non-standard mon-
etary policies had remarkable positive impacts on the financial sector and economy. Peers-
man (2011) analyzed the impacts of non-standard monetary policies for the 1999-2009 pe-
riod by using structural vector autoregressive (SVAR) methodology. Peersman claimed that 
standard and non-standard monetary policy shocks had significant and similar effects on 
the economic activity and inflation. But, he emphasized that the impact of non-standard 
monetary policy on output and inflation was slower and noted that the transmission mech-
anism worked differently for each policy tool. Fahr, et al. (2011) analyzed the transmission 
of non-standard policies into economy by using structural vector autoregressive (SVAR) 
model. They concluded that the policies implemented supported the standard monetary pol-
icy and decreased the financial shocks faced in banking system. In their study Giannone, et 
al. (2011), argued that the non-standard monetary policy measures used after the collapse of 
Lehman Brothers were effective and promoted the credit expansion and economic activity. 
But they also emphasized that the policies did not offer permanent solutions to the structural 
problems in the financial sector. Abbasi and Linzert (2011) claimed that the transmission 
from policy interest rates to market interest rates weakened because of the liquidity short-
age that emerged in the money market after the financial crisis and of the resulting uncertain 
environment and noted that the standard monetary policies failed then. They stated that the 
non-standard monetary policies implemented as of September 2008 made the first stage of 
the transmission effective again. They concluded that the policies decreased the money mar-
ket interest rates that sharply increased after the crisis. Cassola, et al. (2010) analyzed the re-
lation between the measures taken by the ECB and the monetary market interest rates by us-
ing the unrestricted vector autoregressive (VAR) model for the period between 2007 August 
and 2010 October. They claimed that the non-standard monetary policies implemented by 
the ECB contributed to decreasing money market spreads and liquidity premium.
Different from other studies, the study by Pattipeilohy, et al. (2013) focused on the period 
after the emergence of the sovereign debt crisis. This study analyzed the effectiveness of the 
Securities Market Programme (SMP) and the extended liquidity provision (LTRO). The au-
thors claimed that LTRO interventions had short-term impacts on government bond yields 
and that the expansion of SMP to cover Italy and Spain in August 2011 had a remarkable im-
pact on the government bonds but this impact came to an end in a few weeks. In their study, 
Darracq-Paries and De Santis (2013) analyzed the macro-economic effects of long-term 
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refinancing operations (LTROs) introduced by the ECB in December 2011 and February 
2012. They stated that the non-standard monetary policy improved the banks’ conditions for 
loans and prevented a sudden decrease in loan supplies. They also claimed that the policy 
enhanced the standard interest rate policy. Boeckx, et al. (2014) analyzed the effectiveness 
of the non-standard monetary policies implemented by the ECB for the period 2008-2013 
by using SVAR methodology. They analyzed the exogenous innovations to the balance sheet 
of the ECB. They concluded that an increase in the ECB’s balance sheet led to an increase in 
outputs and prices in the Euro area. In this regard, they argued that the non-standard mon-
etary policy tools that expanded the balance sheet of the central bank had an impact on the 
economy. They also studied the impacts of balance sheet shocks on the variables of the fi-
nancial market and the banking sector. They claimed that an increase in the balance sheets 
of the ECB improved the conditions of households and firms for borrowing from banks and 
affected the financial stability. Finally, the impact of balance sheet shocks on the output and 
prices was separately analyzed for each country in the Euro area. They concluded that the 
impact on prices was quite similar among countries but the impact on output was different. 
It was particularly emphasized that the impact on output was insignificant in countries that 
were more affected by the crisis. In her study, Szczerbowicz (2015) analyzed the impacts of 
non-standard monetary policies implemented by the ECB on the borrowing costs of banks 
and governments. The study argued that three-year LTROs and lowering deposit rate to zero 
defused the tensions in the monetary markets and central bank interventions had a decreas-
ing impact on the re-borrowing costs of the banks and governments that existed particularly 
in countries at high risk.
Although econometric analysis concluded that the policies implemented by the ECB were 
effective, it should be noted that there was some uncertainty about the long-term impacts of 
non-standard monetary policies in general since such policies may lead the investors to take 
too much risk in financial markets when the interest rates are at low levels. Also, non-stan-
dard monetary policies leading to the expansion of the balance sheets of central banks may 
have an inflationist pressure on monetary policies (Peersman, 2014:13-14).
IV. NON-STANDARD MONETARY POLICIES ADOPTED BY THE EUROPEAN 
CENTRAL BANK
After the adoption of Euro as the single currency by the EU members, the European Cen-
tral Bank was assigned the task of pursuing the monetary policy by the member countries of 
the Euro area. The ECB was established to implement the monetary policy as an indepen-
dent institution (Scheller, 2006:41-43). This makes the ECB different from the other cen-
tral banks of developed countries as the policies implemented by the ECB are not specific 
to a single country unlike what is observed in other countries (like US, Japan, and Canada) 
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(De La Dehesa, 2013:52). Essentially, it is important to consider two factors while evaluating 
the monetary policies adopted by the ECB to fight against the financial crisis. The first one 
is the impact of the specific conditions and differences in the institutional structure of the 
EMU (Economic and Monetary Union). The second one is that the Euro area has remark-
able financial differences when compared to other big economies, which cannot be ignored 
(Cour-Thimann and Winkler, 2013:5-7).
The central banks of developed countries took several measures against the crisis that 
gained a global dimension after the collapse of the Lehman Brothers in September 2008, af-
fecting all economies. Since banks in the Euro area have an important role in the transmis-
sion of monetary policy, the ECB introduced the policy of enhanced credit support to en-
able banks to regain this function. In early 2010, the Securities Markets Programme was put 
into effect as some uncertainties started to emerge on financing public debt in some mem-
ber countries in the Euro area. Initially focusing on the debt securities of Greece, Ireland, 
and Portugal, the Securities Markets Programme was expanded in August 2011 to cover the 
debt securities of Italy and Spain. In addition, the Outright Monetary Transaction (OMT) 
was announced; two Long-term Refinancing Operations (LTROs) were introduced, and 
open-ended forward guidance was adopted by the ECB (Eser and Schwaab, 2016:164). All 
these non-standard monetary policy tools introduced by the ECB are independent of stan-
dard monetary policy tools and aim to make standard policy tools functional in the markets 
again. They were adopted for a temporary period to realize this goal (Trichet, 2013:238). 
These monetary measures introduced by the ECB against the crisis were analyzed under 
three periods following Cassola, et al. (2010), Lane (2012), Trichet (2013) and Drudi, et al. 
(2012).
IV.1. Financial Turmoil (2007August – 2008 September Period)
During the period between August 2007 and September 2008, the first phase of the fi-
nancial crisis, the central banks of developed countries supported the markets by changing 
not the size but the compositions of their balance sheets (Lenza, et al., 2010:302). The mort-
gage crisis starting in the U.S. affected the Euro area since the banks operating in the area 
had invested in mortgage-backed securities. Moreover, the banks largely stopped funding 
their counterparts in the interbank money market in the emerging uncertain environment. 
This led to a liquidity shortage in the interbank money market. The European Central Bank 
was one of the first bank intervening in the market then and provided banks with liquidity 
to meet their financial needs (Fahr, et al. 2011:26; ECB, 2010c:68). With the measures taken 
in the first phase of the crisis, the ECB aimed to keep the short term interest rate close to 
the monetary policy interest rate, rebuild the confidence in the economy, and thereby mak-
ing the monetary market functional (ECB, 2015a:11). Indeed, the measures taken then kept 
short-term market interest rates close to monetary policy interest rates (Trichet, 2010:10).
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IV.2. Financial Crisis (2008 September – 2010 May Period)
Liquidity was injected into the market as a response to the liquidity shortage, which 
was a serious problem before the collapse of the Lehman Brothers. The liquidity crisis in 
the first phase of the financial crisis left its place to a confidence crisis in the second phase 
(Durré, et al. 2014:403). This was a result of the uncertainties about payment of the debt 
that started to emerge in the market after the collapse of the Lehman Brothers as the finan-
cial system had too many risk assets within itself (Claessens, et al. 2010:13). In this regard, 
the European Central Bank introduced non-standard monetary policy tools along with 
the standard ones following the collapse of the Lehman Brothers. In coordination with 
the central banks of other developed countries (Fed, Bank of England, Bank of Canada, 
Sveriges Riksbank, and the Swiss National Bank), the ECB decreased the short-term in-
terest rates used as standard policy tools by 325 basis points in seven months (from Octo-
ber 2008 to May 2009), from 4.25 % to 1.00% (Fahr, et al. 2011: 27-28; Abbasi and Linzert, 
2011:11; ECB, 2010a:65; Trichet, 2010:10-11).
Non-standard monetary policy tools were adopted to support the standard monetary 
policy tools and help the transmission of monetary policy to the economy (Giannone, et 
al. 2011:16). But, it is quite important to emphasize one point. It is out of the question for 
the ECB in particular to put non-standard monetary policy tools in effect after short-term 
interest rates fall to the lowest level, thereby loosing function. When short-term interest 
rates are set to ensure price stability, the transmission of the policy tool to the economy 
may not happen in case of a crisis. Non-standard monetary policy tools are used to make 
the transmission possible again. In other words, standard and non-standard monetary pol-
icy tools used in the Euro area are, to a great extent, independently determined. Standard 
policy tools are determined taking medium and long-term price stability into consider-
ation. Non-standard monetary policy tools are adopted to activate the transmission mech-
anism (Trichet, 2013:231-232). Actually, non-standard monetary policy tools introduced 
by the ECB were implemented not to replace but to support the standard policy tools (Gi-
annone, et al. 2011:5; Cour-Thimann and Winkler, 2013:20).
Non-standard monetary policy tools introduced by the ECB in addition to the stan-
dard monetary policy tools after September 2008 were the policy of enhanced credit sup-
port composed of five elements (ECB, 2010c: 68). The features specific to the Euro area 
were the reason for the implementation of this policy. Firstly, the banks make up the main 
source of finance in the Euro area when compared to the U.S. Secondly, there are a lot of 
small and medium sized firms dependent on bank credits in the Euro area. Finally, the 
wage and price of goods and services in the Euro area change more slowly (Trichet, 2009:8-
9).
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The first element of enhanced credit support is fixed-rate allocation policy. With this 
policy, banks are provided with unlimited liquidity on adequate collateral at fixed rate for 
the refinancing operations (ECB, 2010c:68). These kinds of tendencies increase the de-
mands of banks for liquidity from central bank. As a result, the European Central Bank’s 
balance sheet expanded (Fahr, et al. 2010:53). The purpose of this policy is to keep the 
stress emerging in the banking system under control and provide households and firms 
with credits. It was not the European Central Bank that decided the amount of the liquidity 
provided to the banking system. In contrast, the market itself was given the opportunity to 
make the decision on the size of the intervention (Lenza, et al., 2010:314; ECB, 2009b:83). 
The second element is the expansion of the list of assets accepted as eligible collateral by 
the ECB. The purpose here is to implement the fixed-rate allocation policy as well as pre-
venting collateral from causing any problem (ECB, 2009b:82). The third element is the 
extension of the maturity of refinancing operations from 3 months to 6 months. Then it 
was extended to one year. As a result, the banking system was provided with liquidity of 
442 billion Euro in June, 2009 (Trichet, 2009:13). The goal of this operation was to make 
banks less dependent on short-term financing (Giannone, et al. 2011:14). The fourth ele-
ment was the liquidity provision of foreign currency to help banks fund their foreign cur-
rency assets. The aim was to help prevent banks operating in the Euro area from having a 
problem of funding their assets denominated in U.S. dollar (Trichet, 2010:13). The fifth el-
ement is the covered bond purchase programme. Covered bond market is the main source 
of finance for most banks operating in the Euro area. With the collapse of this market fol-
lowing the financial crisis, the European Central Bank announced that they would pur-
chase covered bond of €60 billion over 12 months from May 2009 to June 2010. Covered 
bonds are long term debt securities exported by banks and used for long-term refinanc-
ing operations. The goal of the program is to enliven the markets in short of liquidity and 
give banks an opportunity to resolve the mismatch between asset and liability accounts 
(Trichet, 2010:13; Trichet, 2009:14). In their study, Beirne, et al. (2011) stated that this 
program that was put in effect contributed to decreasing money market interest rates, re-
ducing the funding cost of banks, helping them give more credits, and overcoming the li-
quidity shortage in debt securities market. However, they also emphasized that the sover-
eign debt crisis led the program not to function properly in some countries particularly.
In 2009, the fluctuation in the money markets slow down; the economy started to re-
cover slowly though; the financial market conditions began to give positive signals. The 
non-standard policies fulfilled the expected function. In this regard, the ECB announced 
that they would gradually remove these policies after the financial system started to nor-
malize (Fahr, et al. 2010:57; Cassola, et al. 2010:9; ECB, 2010a:70-71).
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IV.3. Sovereign Debt Crisis (2010 May – 2014 June Period 1)
During two previous periods, the ECB came across problems similar to those of other 
central banks had (Drudi, et al. 2012:3). However, the focus of the global financial crisis slid 
into the Euro area in the third phase of the crisis (Trichet, 2013:237). Falling growth rates, 
decreasing tax rates, and increasing social expenses after the financial crisis caused the coun-
tries to have more budgetary problems (Fawley and Neely, 2013:72). After the collapse of the 
Lehman Brothers, there were such incentives as state guarantees and capital injections pro-
vided by the countries in the Euro area to support the banking sector. As a result of these 
measures, in early 2010, some uncertainties started to emerge on financing the public debts 
of some countries in the sovereign bond markets within the Euro area (Drudi, et al., 2012:9). 
Some countries in the Euro area had increasing public debts and faced the challenge of sus-
taining these debts, and their credit ratings were downgraded because of the increase in the 
sovereign risk spreads, all of which contributed to emerging uncertainties (EC, 2009:44).
table 1. Long-term Foreign Currency Sovereign Ratings in Some Euro Area Countries
country credit rating in 2007 When the credit rating was 
downgraded
credit rating in 2009 outlook
Greece A December 17, 2009 BBB+ Negative
Ireland AAA June 8, 2009 AA Negative
Spain AAA January 19, 2009 AA+ Stable
Portugal AA- January 21, 2009 A+ Stable
Source: Attinasi, et al. (2010: 38).
The process that started when some doubts emerged about the financing of public debts 
in Greece started to influence Ireland and Portugal in mid-2010. This process also affected 
Spain but to some extent. The credit rating of Greece and Ireland was downgraded BBB+ and 
AA in 2009, and the outlook turned negative for both countries. The credit rating of Spain 
and Portugal changed to AA+ and A+, making the outlook stable. All these developments 
destroyed the transmission channel again, which had actually started to recover (Cassola, et 
al. 2010:10-11). As a result, the ECB put the Securities Markets Programme into effect on 10 
May 2010. The purpose of this programme is to restore the dysfunctional market segments 
by injecting liquidity to the debt securities markets and make the monetary transmission 
mechanism functional again (Trichet, 2013:237).
1 The purpose of the non-standard monetary policies implemented by the ECB before June 2014 was to overcome 
the troubles experienced in the monetary transmission mechanism. The purpose of those implemented after 
June 2014, though, was to provide more monetary convenience as well as improving the monetary transmission 
mechanism (ECB, 2015b: 1-2 ; ECB, 2015a: 15). Those policies are not within the scope of the period analyzed 
in this article. To have more information about those policies, please see ECB (2015b).
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The monetary policy measures taken and the bank rescue packages implemented by gov-
ernments tried to repair the destruction caused by the financial crisis. However, the finan-
cial structures of countries entering the financial crisis with already distorted structure de-
teriorated with rescue packages. Moreover, as the investors lost their trust for risky financial 
assets and after path-finder tried they moved to low gains but safe government bonds. While 
choosing government bonds, the investors based their choices on the creditworthiness of 
countries and the liquidity of bond markets (Attinasi, et al. 2010:35-39). In this case, the 
biggest fluctuation in sovereign bond spreads was observed in countries facing the finan-
cial crisis with worse financial conditions (ECB, 2009c:37). This can be obviously seen in the 
figure below. The biggest fluctuation in sovereign bond spreads was observed in Greece, fol-
lowed by Portugal and Ireland. Actually, Ejsing and Lemke (2009) analyzed bank and sover-
eign credit risk premiums in ten countries within the Euro area between January 2008 and 
June 2009. They stated that the risk premiums of banks decreased but the sovereign risks in-
creased after most governments announced their bank rescue packages in October 2008. 
This was attributed to the change in the perception of investors about the credit risk: a risk 
transfer from the banking sector to public sector.
figure 2. Sovereign Bond Yields (10-year maturity) 
Source: Eurostat
Initially focusing on the debt securities of Greece, Ireland, and Portugal, the Securities Mar-
ket Programme was expanded to cover the debt securities of Italy and Spain in August 2011. 
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In early 2012 when the market conditions started to recover, the ECB stopped bond purchase. 
€220 billion of sovereign bonds were purchased by the ECB from countries in financial stress 
in February 2012 (Fratzscher, et al, 2014:6). The Securities Markets Programme, however, was 
not very effective because of the perception that the decisions of the ECB were made aversely 
(De La Dehesa, 2013:48). Moreover, the second Covered Bond Purchase Programme (CBPP2), 
exceeding €40 billion, was put into effect. But, it should be noted that the most important mea-
sure was the Outright Monetary Transactions 2 (OMT) programme announced on September 
6, 2012 (Rodríguez and Carrasco, 2014:11). The purpose of the programme was to make the 
monetary transmission mechanism functional again and provide homogenous credit terms 
within the Euro area (Szczerbowicz, 2015:102). The most essential element of the programme 
was that it included the phrase “unlimited”. After the announcement of the programme, the 
government bound spreads within the Euro area dramatically decreased (Peersman, 2014:3-
4). Also, the ECB implemented two LTROs (three year Long-Term Refinancing Operations) 
in December 2011 and February 2012 with intent to enhance the liquidity conditions of banks 
(Pattipeilohy, et al., 2013:18). With these two operations, the banks ran into debt of more than 
€1 trillion. All this process resulted in the expansion of the balance sheet of the ECB (Peers-
man, 2014:11). The figure below shows that the balance sheet of the ECB expanded particularly 
in 2012 after the introduction of the non-standard monetary policies.
figure 3. ECB Balance Sheet (Total Assets / Billion Euros) 
Source: European Central Bank
2 Although the programme was announced, it was not put into effect (Rodríguez and Carrasco, 2014: 11). 
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Another non-standard monetary policy tool used by the ECB is forward guidance. A 
strategy for giving information about the future monetary policies of central banks in ad-
vance, forward guidance was adopted by the ECB later than by the central banks of devel-
oped countries like the Fed, the Boj, and the Bank of England (Shirai, 2013:4). The forward 
guidance was introduced by the European Central Bank on July 4, 2013. The Governing 
Council of the ECB announced that:
The Governing Council expects the key ECB interest rates to remain at present or lower 
levels for an extended period of time. This expectation is based on the overall subdued out-
look for inflation extending into the medium term, given the broad-based weakness in the 
real economy and subdued monetary dynamics (ECB, 2013).
The forward guidance adopted by the ECB is an example of open-ended forward guid-
ance. However, as argued by Praet (2013 30-31) the open-ended forward guidance imple-
mented by the ECB includes both “Delphic” and “Odyssean” features 3. It includes Delphic 
features as the monetary policy that will be pursued by the ECB in the future is based on 
the current information. It includes Odyssean features as it states that it will stick to the Eu-
ropean Central Bank’s aim to keep inflation rate close to or below 2 percent over the medi-
um-term and that it will go on taking the necessary measures to achieve this goal.
Open-ended forward guidance has given for qualitative information to market partici-
pants on the expected future path of policy rate (Bank of England, 2013:21). But, it is uncer-
tain in open-ended forward guidance under which conditions the policy will be tightened or 
when it will come to an end (Carney, 2013:15). Despite having an advantage of giving cen-
tral banks flexibility for unexpected conditions, implementing such a policy is disadvanta-
geous in terms of providing the public with inadequate and uncertain information (Bank of 
England, 2013:21). As stated by Rodríguez and Carrasco (2014:12), the forward guidance 
adopted by the ECB made the policy less effective because of such factors as not including a 
specific time period or not setting threshold values on certain variables.
V. THE IMPACT OF FISCAL CONDITION ON MONETARY POLICY
Although non-standard monetary policy measures taken in response to sovereign debt 
crisis were good at calming down the markets, it is not possible for them to resolve crises 
because of their inherent structure (Eijffinger and Hoogduin, 2012:36). The policies im-
plemented by the ECB are not specific to one single country as observed in other coun-
tries (US, Japan, Canada) (De La Dehesa, 2013:52). The monetary policy in the Euro area is 
3 In the work of Campbell, et al. (2012), forward guidance is classified as “Delphic” and “Odyssean”. According 
to this classification, the forward guidance of central banks that does not include commitment is called 
“Delphic” while the forward guidance that involves commitment is called “Odyssean” forward guidance.
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implemented by the ECB. The fiscal policy, though, is implemented by the governments of 
countries. Against the negative spillover effects of the fiscal policy of one country on the oth-
ers, the rules of implementing national fiscal policies in the Euro area are based on the Sta-
bility and Growth Pact (SGP). The Maastricht Treaty in 1992 laid the foundations for the Sta-
bility and Growth Pact (Eyraud and Wu, 2015:5). According to the Maastricht criteria, the 
budget deficit of a member country is not to exceed 3 percent of its GDP and 60 percent of 
the ratio of its public debt to its GDP (EC, 2013:7).
The European debt crisis revealed the need for better-founded public financing. Prior 
to the financial crisis, the member countries that fell into the European debt crisis were 
not able to use the high growth rates they achieved to strengthen their budgetary positions 
(EC, 2013: 11). In Greece, for instance, its entry into the Economic and Monetary Union 
to the outbreak of the crisis (2001-2008) which was called the “golden age” of Greek econ-
omy, growth rates increased; unemployment decreased; the inflation rate was kept down al-
though it was above the Euro area average. Despite these improvements, a positive progress 
was not achieved in terms of overcoming the fiscal problems. Although the ratio of public 
debt to GDP was stabilized at about 100%, this rate was still quite above the Euro area aver-
age (Alogoskoufis, 2012:11). In Ireland, which was the second most severely affected coun-
try by the European debt crisis, the interest rates were low after joining the monetary union, 
and land and housing investments were mostly financed by the banking system via short-
term foreign funds, especially after 2003. The liquidity shortage that emerged in the interna-
tional markets following the crisis left the banking system in a difficult situation and made 
the financial sector more fragile (Honohan, 2010:136; Honohan, 2009:2). Prior to the crisis, 
even though the ratio of public debt to GDP was below the Maastricht level, the bank rescue 
packages introduced as well as the public debt stock that remarkably increased, caused more 
concerns about the Irish economy. There was a partly similar situation in Spain (Eijffinger 
and Hoogduin, 2012:32). In Portugal, the financial loss resulting from the state-owned en-
terprises increased the public debt stock (Blanchard, et al. 2013:12). The table below shows 
how the ratio of public debts to GDP changed for the countries that went through the Euro-
pean sovereign debt crisis.
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figure 4. Government Debt (% GDP) 
Source: Eurostat
It can be seen that the budget deficit exceeded the Maastricht Criteria in the countries 
that faced the European debt crisis following the 2008 crisis. For example, the budget deficit 
in Greece was always above the Maastricht level after adopting Euro, but this did not cause a 
problem until 2009. However, the early election held in October 2009 ended with the victory 
of a socialist party led by Papandreu, resulting in a governmental reshuffle. The new govern-
ment announced that the budget deficit in Greece was 12,7 percent of the GDP for 2009 (Ar-
ghyrou and Tsoukalas, 2011:174). The investors were concerned because this figure was al-
most two times more than the one announced by the previous government, and the Greek 
government admitted that the budget deficit figures announced earlier would not be accu-
rate (Oxford Economics, 2010). Similarly, Portugal already had a budget deficit problem be-
fore the financial crisis, but it deepened in the aftermath. The collapse of the construction 
activity in Ireland led to a decrease in the gains from tax revenues. When the world econ-
omy faced a deep recession in September 2008, the economy contracted by -6,4 in 2009, and 
the budget surplus achieved in many years suddenly turned into budget deficit (Whelan, 
2011:7).
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figure 5. Government Deficit/Surplus 
Source: Eurostat
As a response to these weaknesses, rules known as ‘Six-pack’ were set for the fiscal pol-
icy in the aftermath of the European debt crisis 4 (EC, 2013:11-12). The European debt crisis 
showed us the following: the crisis of the sustainability of the fiscal structure in some coun-
tries of the Euro area began to endanger the financial stability in the Euro area because of the 
high integration and the risk of contagion among the countries (Eijffinger and Hoogduin, 
2012:32). This leads us to the following conclusion: If countries build enough fiscal buffers 
when their economies go smoothly, they may have a higher capacity of responding and pre-
venting the shocks to occur during an economic crisis. But the countries of the Euro area es-
pecially the peripheral ones were not fiscally strong enough to prevent big shocks when the 
crisis began (Eyraud and Wu, 2015:9).
VI. CONCLUSION
Most central banks introduced non-standard monetary policy tools after the collapse of 
Lehman Brothers which were appropriate to their own financial systems in order to ensure 
monetary policy transmission. During this period, the ECB also implemented non-stan-
dard monetary policies along with the standard policy tools just as other central banks of 
4 See EC 2013 for further information.
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developed countries (like Fed, Bank of England) did. However, it is important to take some 
specific points into consideration while evaluating the monetary policies of the ECB in par-
ticular. Firstly, the policies adopted by the ECB were not specific to one single country. Sec-
ondly, the policies implemented were prepared by considering the factor that the banking 
system was the major source of financing in Europe. This study analyzes the monetary pol-
icy measures taken by the European Central Bank according to specific periods. The first pe-
riod corresponds to the time just after the crisis, and the characteristic feature of this period 
is that the European Central Bank tried to find a solution to the crisis by providing liquid-
ity to the market as there was liquidity crunch in the interbank monetary market. This pe-
riod, 2007 August - 2008 September, gained a new dimension with the collapse of Lehman 
Brothers. Besides the shortage of liquidity, some uncertainties also emerged on the banks’ 
potential for repaying their debts. During the second period covering September 2008 – May 
2010, the European Central Bank introduced non-standard monetary policy tools as well as 
decreasing the policy interest rates. Indeed, these policies had an impact on eliminating the 
uncertainties in the financial markets. The financial crisis in the Euro area, however, turned 
into a sovereign debt crisis in 2010. The bank rescue packages introduced by the countries 
after the collapse of Lehman Brothers were perceived by investors as a transfer of credit risk 
from the banking sector to the public sector. This caused a fluctuation in long-term govern-
ment bond yields in the countries that entered the crisis with an already deteriorated finan-
cial structure and in the countries whose financial structure deteriorated after the outbreak 
of the crisis. During the third period covering the time after May 2010, the Securities Mar-
kets Programme was firstly introduced. The program was expanded to cover the debt secu-
rities of Italy and Spain in August 2011. In addition, two LTROs were introduced in Decem-
ber 2011 and February 2012.
Offering a descriptive analysis of the non-standard monetary policies implemented by 
the ECB after the crisis, this study helps draw the following conclusions. The reason why the 
ECB implemented non-standard monetary policies except for the forward guidance during 
the period analyzed (between August 2007 and June 2014) was different from that of other 
central banks. They introduced non-standard policy tools after the standard monetary pol-
icy tools lost their function. The ECB, though, introduced those policy tools to help the 
transmission mechanism deteriorated in time become functional again and to support the 
standard monetary policy tools. Also, the policies implemented by the ECB were not specific 
to one single country because of its institutional structure, which was unlike the case in other 
countries (US, Japan, Canada). Since its foundation, the ECB has focused on the policies ap-
propriate to be implemented in all member countries. The fiscal policy, though, does not 
have such central features, and it is implemented by national governments. Although there 
are some general policy frameworks like Stability Growth Pact, they have generally been re-
garded as loose principles. It was not seen as a problem to loosen such framework principles 
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especially before the crisis. But the breakout of the crisis showed the need to pay more at-
tention to heterogeneous features of the countries’ fiscal policies and to the problems result-
ing from the countries’ different policy contexts. Another important conclusion to be drawn 
about monetary policies during a crisis is that having an inadequate fiscal buffer- even if 
such common standards exist- has a decisive role in the response to crises faced. Despite the 
similar policy frameworks, the difference between the EU countries having a strong fiscal 
buffer and those lacking it indicates the importance of having strong fiscal structure during 
a crisis. If countries build adequate fiscal buffers when their economic conditions are good, 
they have more capacity to respond and to prevent the shocks faced during an economic cri-
sis. Indeed, having a strong fiscal structure gives them more room to maneuver in the pol-
icies to be adopted during a crisis. The conclusion to be drawn from the experience of har-
monizing the fiscal systems that do not have homogeneous features during that period is that 
budgetary and fiscal conditions have a key role in determining effective monetary policies. 
Therefore, general economic factors may have complicated impacts on shaping the expected 
results of policies when there are various implementations of monetary policies.
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